Abstract -Taxation and risk taking are examined in a general equilibrium mode/ that incorporates uncertain government revenue and allows the government to influence risk through portfolio investments as well as through tax r policy. It is demonstra ted that each of a wide range of taxes can be decomposed into some combina tion of a wage tax, an ex ante wealth tax, and a modification of the government's investment portfolio. For example, with an adjustment in the government's portfolio, an income tax is equivalent to a wage tax plus an ex ante wealth tax (or, alternatively, a tax on riskless return)-taxes that absorb no investment risk and yield certain revenue.
INTRODUCTION
Modern study of taxation and risk taking commenced with Domar and Musgrave (1944) . They examined how investors would allocate their portfolios between safe and risky assets (e.g., between cash and stock) in the presence of an income tax. Their clearest result was that an income tax (in which investment losses are *Harvard Univewty and the National search, Cambridge, MA 02138.
Bureau of Economic Redeductible without limit) increases risk taking because the tax absorbs a portion of the risk. With a proportional tax of 50 percent, half of both the upside and downside variation would belong to the government. For given risk preferences, investors would increase their holdings of risky assets, in the simplest case reproducing the level of private risk they held previously. This implied an increase in total risk-taking activity in the economy.
Both Domar and Musgrave's initial article and a large subsequent literature have explored many variations of and qualifications to this story.' This article seeks to extend work that addresses general equilibrium problems with the familiar argument.2 First, when the government taxes risky investments, its revenue will be uncertain, particularly when there is significant systematic risk in the economy (as from macroeconomic fluctuations). To avoid surpluses and deficits, either government spending must change or taxes must adjust in the short or long run. Second, the use of government revenue may itself affect individuals' risk-taking behavior. Third, the hypothesized increase in private risk taking due to income taxation will affect equilibrium in asset markets.
In addition IO analytical limitations, the policy relevance of prior work is unclear. Previous analysis does not indicate whether any effects of taxation on risk taking are desirable or detrimental. Furthermore, it is useful to consider whether other government policies could offset effects of taxation on risk or directly affect risk without resorting to particular forms elf taxation.
The literature that addresses some of these shortcomings contains markedly diverging approaches and results, making it difficult to construct a clear picture of the problem. The present article seeks to illuminate taxation and risk taking by using a simple, but complete, general equilibrium framework, which differs from prior studies by assuming that the government, like taxpayers, may buy and sell safe and risky assets. In the spirit of Musgrave's (1959) concept of differential tax incidence, this article identifres equivalences among various forms of taxation that finance the same level of government spendrng. The main results are that a proportional income tax is equivalent to a tax that absorbs no risk, and proportional wage and consumption taxes-widely believed to treat risky returns differently--are equivalent.
To suggest the argument, begin with the familiar partial equilibrium result that an income tax induces investors to increase their holdings of risky assets to the point at which their private risk is restored to Its prior level. Suppose that these additional rwsky assets are purchased from the government (which sells short, if necessary). Then, the risky return relinquished to investors when selling them risky assets precisely offsets the risky government revenue produced by the income tax. The result is a sort of "musical shares" in which investors' after-tax returns, government revenue, and asset market equilibriurn are all unaffected. This argument is developed in the next section, which is followed by discussion of actual government behavior and of the relevante of the results for tax policy.
ANALYSIS

Model
The simple, standard model used in the literature (see, e.g., A{kinson and Stiglitz, 1980; Sandmo, 1885 ) is supplemented here by incordorating government action--the govhrnment's choice of an investment portffolio and the use of government revenu IF -in a general manner The represen ative individual's after-investment wealth in period 1, in the absence of taxes, is
where y is a given lev$l of wage income in period 0 (all of whi#h is invested), r is the rate of return on $ riskless asset, x is the uncertain rate of @urn on a risky asset (x L -l), and a,is the portion invested iI1 the risky asset. (There is no constraint that 0 I a F 1; that is, individuals may borrow at-id sell short.) All returns in period 1 arcj consumed. The individual chooses a tQ maxtmize expected utility, although it will not be necessary in the presert investigation to determine explicitly hoiw this is done. There is no restriction on the manner in which utility depends $n government revenue, whic:h can bq imagined to be spent on public goods1 rebated lump sum, or whatever. where T, is tax revenue collected in period i and (Y is the portion invested in the risky asset. As with expenditure policy, the results derived below require no special assumption concerning how the government chooses OL for a given tax regime; they require only that the objective function that determines the choice be independent of the tax regime that generates period 0 revenue to be invested and period 1 revenue to be spent.
Most of the model's assumptions are standard: no inheritance or other sources of wealth, no choice between labor and leisure, no choice between initial consumption and savings, only two assets (one riskless), no borrowing or lending constraints (or differences in the interest rate for borrowing and lending), and only one period in which investment decisions are made. The taxes to be examined are proportional and nondiscriminatory, with full loss offsets. As will become apparent, many of these assumptions-including some that have been important in previous studies-are unnecessary to reach the conclusions derived here.
Aside from allowing government revenue to enter individual utility in a general manner, the only addition concerns government portfolio policy. It is assumed that the government has access to the same investment opportunities as do individuals: i.e., it borrows and lends at the same rate and may purchase or sell short the risky asset.3 The results below depend upon the government's ability to affect the riskiness of its revenue in period 1 (and, as a by-product, the total level of investment in each asset in period 0) through its portfolio choice as well as its selection of a tax regime. This addition to conventional models is unavoidable if one wishes to account for government revenue: any comparison of tax regimes, some of which collect revenue ex ante and some of which collect revenue ex post, must specify what is done with the tax proceeds from period 0 before they are spent by the government in period 1.
The Concept of Equivalence
Two tax regimes are deemed equivalent if, for any choice of a tax rate and a government portfolio under one regime, there exists a tax rate and a government portfolio under the other regime such that
(1) for any return that might be realized on the risky asset, investors have the same after-tax wealth in period 1 under both regimes; (2) for any return that might be realized on the risky asset, the government has the same revenue in period 1 under both regimes; and (3) total investment in each asset in period 0 is the same under both regimes.
These requirements for equivalence are stringent in ways that are important for understanding the effects and desirability of tax policy. First, for each possible outcome, investors are assumed to do equally well under both regimes. Thus, if the risky asset produces a high return, the investors will do better under both regimes to the same extent. (They would, of course, be indifferent between two regimes with quite different consequences as long as one regime's benefits in some states jusit equaled its costs in others; it would be difficult, however, to know when this was true, and investors with differing risk preferences might evaluate such regimes differently.) Second, governrnent revenue must be unaffected. This guarantees that social welfare will not differ on account of differences in government expenditures. Moreover, any effects of government expenditures on investors' risk-taking behavior will be the same under both regimes. Third, when total investment in each type of asset is unaffected, asset returns will be the same under each regime.
Failing to satisfy these (admittedly strong) conditions has important implications. If any condition fails (and, if one fails, typically the others will), a model must explicitly consider how government expenditures in different states are determined, how government expenditures enter individual utility functions, and how, in turn the demand for assets will be affected in order to determine behavior, let alone social welfare. Much of the literature neither demonstrates equivalence in this strong sense nor models important components identified here, thereby failing to produce valid general equilibrium results Moreover, the conclusions beiow cast doubt on most partial equilibrium results, even as to simple behavioral effects.
Income Taxation
A proportional income tax is equivalent to a wage tax plus an ex ante wealth tax (that is, a tax on wealth tn period 0). To see why this is true, begin by observing that an income tax applies to wages and investment returns. Thus, the stated result holds if and only if a tax on investment returns is equivalent to an ex ante wealth tax.
A tax on investment returns can be decomposed into a tax on riskless returns and a tax on excess returns. A tax on riskless rleturnsS means $ tax on all investment as if it earned the riskless return: even if the investor puts all his funds into the risky asset, wt$ch earns x, the investor is taxed on the return r, regardless of whether it is grqater than or less than x. A tax on excess returns i's a tax on the difference betwpen the actual return-x if it is the risky asset---and the riskless return. Thus, thee tax on riskless returns taxes the return r regardless of the actual return and the tax on excess returns taxes any difference, x -r (which is negative-a lbss is allowedwhen x < r).
Consider the tax on ris less returns. The tax due In perwod 1 eq ," als ytr, because y is the total amount invksted, the entire investment IS assumed to earn r, and this return is taxed at rlate t. In ai regime without such a tax, thq government could produce period 11 revenue of ytr by investing ytr/(l + r) in the riskless asselt in /period 0. Morqover, it could oblain the funds to make this investment using an ex ante wealth tax, with a rate equal to tr/(l + r). Thus, an ex (ante wealth tax gives the government the same period 1 revenue as the tax on riskless returns. Similarlb/, individuals subject to the ex ante wedlth tax can (and would) achieve the saqe period 1 position as under the tax oln riskless returns if they decrease their irrvestment in the riskless asset by the aqount of the ex =?nte wealth tax.4 FinalIt, because individuals' decreased investment in the riskless {assei: exactly equals the governrnen t's increased investment, asset markets would be in equilibrium. This establishes that a tax 0~ riskless returns is equivalent to an ex ante wealth tax. Now examine the tax an excess returns. The tax due in period 1 equals ayt(x -r) In a regime without such a tax, the government could produce period 1 revenue of ayt(x -r) by purchasing an additional ayt of the risky asset (producing a return of ay&) and selling afl of the riskless asset (reducing the government's return by afir). Thus, a pure portfolio adjustment gives the government the same period 1 revenue in all states as the tax on excess returns. Similarly, when the tax on excess returns is removed, individuals can (and would) achieve the same period 1 position as under the tax on excess returns if they decrease the portion of their investment in the risky asset by the tax rate. When this is done, individuals sell the risky asset and purchase the riskless asset in amounts precisely offsetting the government's portfolio adjustment, so asset markets would be in equilibrium. With an appropriate portfolio adjustment, therefore, a tax on excess returns is equivalent to no tax at all.
In summary, when portfolio adjustments are made in a corresponding manner, an income tax consists of a wage tax plus a tax on riskless returns, equivalent to an ex ante wealth tax, plus a tax on excess returns, which is equivalent to no tax at all. The proportional income tax, therefore, is equivalent to an ex ante tax: the wage tax and ex ante wealth tax are both levied in period 0. This provides a sharp contrast to the view that an essential (and purportedly desirable) feature of the income tax is that it is an ex post tax.
Retrospective Taxation of Capital Gains
A retrospective tax applies not to actual returns but to the total amount available when an investment is liquidated (i.e., without regard to basis); this amount is taxed as if it earned the riskless rate of return throughout the holding period. Auerbach (1991) introduced such a retrospective tax as an alternative to the direct tax on investment returns that occurs under an income tax. He showed that the retrospective tax avoids both deferral and lock-in problems that hamper a realization-based income tax.
In addition to limitations inherent in the partial equilibrium framework Auerbach used, he recognized that his analysis was subject to criticism on grounds of fairness; the retrospective tax "overtaxed" investors when returns were poor and "undertaxed" them when returns were good, undermining the ex post equity characteristics that many believe to be an important feature of the income tax. But analysis similar to that in the previous section can be used to demonstrate that a retrospective tax on investment returns is equivalent to a (direct) tax on investment returns. Thus, when there is proportional taxation with full loss offsets, Auerbach's tax produces effects identical to those of an ideal, accrual income tax. Partial equilibrium problems do not, therefore, undermine his result, and the fairness assessment becomes moot. (Indeed, because we currently have a realization rather than an accrual income tax, defenders of an ideal income tax should favor his alternative on grounds of fairness, in addition to the reasons Auerbach emphasizes.)
Wage versus Consumption Taxation
Wage and consumption taxes are understood to be ex ante and ex post variations on a similar theme: both do not tax riskless returns (the time value of money), but they differ in that the consumption tax depends on actual outcomes of individuals' investments whereas the wage tax does not. In the present framework, however, a proportional wage tax is equivalent to a consumption tax at the same rate. To sketch the argument, suppose that initially there is a wage tax. If the tax were replaced by a consumption tax, the investor would have more assets to invest in period 0 and the government would have less. The government could sell the risky asset, which individuals would buy. Individuals would then have more of the risky return in period 1, but this greater variation would be reduced by the consumption tax. The consumption tax would provide the government with more risky return in period 1, which would precisely offset the reduction in risky return from its selling the risky asset in period 0. (The reasoning parallels that involving the income tax on risky returns.)
Although the wage and consumption tax are recognized to be similar, uncertainty and the difference in effects on government revenue are sometimes advanced as qualifications to equivalence (see, e.g., Bradford, 1986; Graetz, 1980 ). In the model presented here involving proportion4al taxation, such qualifications are incorrect. Equivalence holds even when returns are uncertain and when one accounts for aggregate investment in each type of asset and differences in the flow lof government revenue.
DISCUSSION
Government Portfolio Policy
In the model considered here, government portfolio activity is a perfect substitute for many chalqges in tax regimes. Therefore, by adjusting the government's portfolio in an offsetting manner, it is possible to change tax regimes without changing private and total risk taking. Suppose, however, that one wishes to determine the effects of changing tax regimes under the assurnption that the government's investment portfolio would not be adjusted. In this case, the results would be the same as if one instead assumed that the tax regime remained the same and the government's portfolio changed. For example, shifting from an ex ante to an ex post form of taxation, holding the government's portfolio fixed, is the same as the government borrowing to invest in risky assets, holding the tax regime fixed.
There are some differences between the government bearing risk through taxation and through direcd ownership of risky assets. If the goveirnment actually owned a substantial share of many enterprises, it inevitably Y ould have to consider how to exerci ,e its influence.5 Moreover, although, in ~ principle, it is straightforward for the government to purchase shares of publlicly traded companies, investment in closely held enterprises would be more c/ifficult.6 This limitation, however, may r-rot be of practical importance with regar ment's ability to 4
to the governinflue ce the systematic risk of its revenue flows.
Consider how the government actually conducts its portfolio activity. The most substantial and obvious aspects of the government's portfolio dare its large negative investment in government debt and its sizable real estate holdings. In addition, the governmqnt responds to fluctuations in its revenue by changing tax rates and government expenditures. Such activity has effect4 similar to those of holding risky assets. ,It is necessary to include these dimensions of government action in the analysis in order to determine the effect of tax policy on risk taking and on welfare.
It does not appear that the government adjusts its portfolio in a conscious manner to offset the effects of taxation or particular tax reforms on investors' risktaking behavior.7 Perhaps it should. Alternatively, the lack of direct attention to the problem could reflect a view that the relationship between taxation and risk taking is unimportant.
Government's Role in Absorbing Risk
How government expenditures affect private risk taking and social welfare is re-lated to inquiries concerning the ability of the government to "absorb" systematic risk.8 Bulow and Summers (1984) and Gordon (1985) favor the view that the government cannot absorb systematic risk beyond what the market can accomplish because risk ultimately is borne by individuals. By contrast, others suggest that market imperfections raise the possibility that the government can enhance welfare by absorbing some risk (presumably nonsystematic risk), although the particular imperfections usually are not specified.g The government's ability to absorb risk depends not only on imperfections in financial markets but also on the nature of government expenditures. For example, if the government could spend revenue on a public good with constant returns in production and constant (separable) marginal utility in consumption, it may be optimal for the government to bear all systematic risk, allowing expenditures on the public good to vary in different states. More realistically, at some point, all public goods reach both diminishing returns in production and diminishing marginal utility in consumption. But, as long as public goods are not perfect substitutes for private consumption, the government can absorb risk through such expenditures because public goods are additional assets-ones that can be purchased only by the government.
In any event, the government's ability to absorb risk can be treated separately from inquiries into tax policy if the government's portfolio can be adjusted. That is, however much systematic risk the government should bear, it can bear such risk independently of the chosen form of taxation. As a result, government expenditure and portfolio policies can be ignored, as they have been in much of the previous literature. But the justification cannot be that uncertainty in government revenue simply evaporates. Rather, total risk-which is what is relevant for both behavior and welfare-should be seen as constant in simple, nondiscriminatory models of taxation when choosing between ex post forms of taxation (in which it appears that the government is absorbing private risk and being subjected to uncertainty in its flow of revenue) and ex ante forms of taxation (in which no private risk is absorbed and government revenue is certain). Thus, familiar partial equilibrium results are incorrect except for those concerning wealth effects, but these typically would be the same for two tax regimes that produced a government sector of the same size. The remaining policy choice thus concerns the level of taxation rather than its form, and risk-taking considerations would not seem as important in the ways that usually have been considered.
The Model's Assumptions
Most of the model's assumptions are familiar in the literature, but their implications are not necessarily the same as in a partial equilibrium model. The omission of the choices between labor and leisure and between consumption and savings is not critical: with regard to what is ultimately earned and saved, the analysis shows that there is no difference in individuals' opportunity sets when shifting among equivalent taxes, so these other margins would be unaffected." Also, many partial equilibrium results depend on various assumptions concerning the concavity of individuals' utility functions, particularly whether relative risk aversion rises, falls, or remains constant with increases in wealth. By contrast, the results established here do not require concavity to be specified further."
Other restrictions, such as the assumption that individuals can borrow and lend at the same rate, remain relevant. Similarly, the results apply strictly to simplified forms of taxation: taxes that are proportionall and nondiscriminatory with full loss offsets and rates that do not change over time.13 The general themes developed here would continue to apply in other settings, although the particular equivalelnce results would no longer hold.14
Conclusions
The present lnvestlgation responds to weaknesses in partial equilibrium analysis, a lack of policy relevance in prior work, and a complex array of models designed to addrers taxation and risk taking. By incorporating the government's ability to choose its own investments, it is possible to construct a simple general equilibrium framework to assess a wide range of taxes. The primary results are that standard ex post taxes, under which individuals' payments depend on how well their uncertain investments perform, are equivalent to ex ante taxes that produce certain revenue. Thus, an income tax is equivalent to a wage tax plus an ex ante wealth tax (or, alternatively, a tax on riskless return), and a consumption tax is equivalent to a wage tax. This equivalence takes into account individuals' portfolio adjustments and how the government responds to uncertain revenue produced by various tax regimes. The implication is that tax policy may not need to be greatly concerned with the effects of taxation on risk taking. It should be observed, however, that whereas the present results do not depend on many of the assumptions necessary in prior work, they do depend on other restrictioins, notably that only proportional taxes with full loss offsets were examined.
In addition to conceptual illumination, the equivalence results provide an element of practical guidance. If two forms of taxation are equivalqnt, the choice between them can be bade on grounds other than those concdrning the revenue they raise or their primary effects on behavior. For example, if p wage tax is simpler to administer 01 easier to enforce than a consumpt/on tax, it can be employed without woriying about the government's role Auerbach's (199 1) aring risk. Or, if spective capital gains tax avoids distortions resulting from deferral and lock-fin but is equivalent in principle to accr~ual taxation, one could favor its adoptioh without concern for the possible equity or efficiency implications of the differejnces between the regirnes concerning risk: the differences do not exist if the gov#nment adjusts its portfolio in the maqner described here. Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), and $andmo (1985) . Other notable contributions include Feldstein (1969) , Mintz (1981) , Mossin (1968) , Stiglitz (1969 ), and Tobin (1958 . ' Prtor work Includes Atkirson and Stiglitz (1980) , Gordon (1985) , 2 nd Stiglltz (1972). Such work emphasizes the case in which gov. ernment revenue is reba':ed lump sum to indi.. viduals and notes that different results would apply otherwise. But, as Bulow and Summers (1984) argue, the intend d use of government revenue is decided y not to rebate proceeds lump sum. See als I Hines (1991) and Mintz (1982) . ' It has been remarked th t the effect of a pro.. portional tax on investm i! nt returns is somewhat like making the go, ernment a partner in the enterprise subject tolthe tax or is analogous to the government1 purchasing futures OI shares (see, e.g., Atkins n and Stiglitz, 1980; Bulow and Summers, 19 " 4; Stiglitz, 1972) . But this suggestive anal gy has not been pur, sued directly. 4 That investors would maIke this adjustment follows because their opportunities, defined in terms of period 1 wealth available for consumption, are the same under both regimes; for any result they can achieve under the tax on riskless returns, they can achieve the same result under the ex ante wealth tax by making the choice described in the text (and vice versa). Thus, if their choice under the Initial regime was the one that maximized expected utility, they would make the corresponding choice under the alternative regime. 5 By owning nonvoting shares through taxation-in the past, shares approaching or exceeding 50 percent-rather than directly, the government is subject to the other shareholders diverting proceeds to themselves at the expense of the silent partner-i.e., through tax avoidance and evasion.
' Moral hazard is undoubtedly one of the most important reasons nonsystematic risk is borne, but compulsory government insurance (directly, through relief policies, or indirectly, through taxation) would typically reduce welfare, even after taking account of how individuals would adjust their contractual risksharing arrangements. See Kaplow (1991 a) and endnote 6. Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) sketch a general equilibrium example involving the agency problem, noting that taxes may affect the risk-sharing arrangements. They do not, however, analyze this effect, perform welfare analysis, or consider the use of government revenue. One might also consider housing, where individuals do not diversify (see Rosen, Rosen, and Holtz-Eakin, 1984; and Berkovec and Fullerton, 1992) . By contrast, these omissions are relevant in partial equilibrium models (see, e.g., Ahsan, 1976 ; consumption and portfolio allocation).
In addition, other details, such as effects identified by Sandmo (1977) that may arise when there is more than one risky asset, are irrelevant here.
The rationale for progressive marginal tax rates may be different for wages or wealth than for uncertain investment income. If risk is not systematrc, the effect of ex post taxation is one of insurance, which can be obtained ex ante by investors (as by investing less In risky assets) if they so choose; conventional redistributive arguments thus have no obvious applicability to income differences arising from voluntarily undertaken investment risks. Also, if risk is systematic, all investors are In the same position ex post (all are wealthy or all are poor); systematic risk cannot be extinguished by redistribution. Gordon's (1985) model of corporate capital income taxation, which contains many details of actual taxes, IS "simple" in the sense described here.
Another important restriction is that the model considers only investment behavior in one period. Allowing many periods, with labor, consumption, and investment decisions in each, makes the definition and practical implementation of ex ante and ex post concepts more complex.
